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This paper provides simple, transparent intuition for the perhaps surpris-
ing and certainly widely debated empirical findings of ”environmental Kuznets
curves”, i.e. U-shaped relationships between per-capita income and indicators
of environmental quality. We consider one possible component of such rela-
tionships: the linkage between income and household choices that impact upon
the environment. Our explicit model emphasizes two features. First, degrada-
tion of the environmental endowment is a by-product of household activities.
We present a household production model in which consumption of marketed
commodities generates both a ”good”, desired non-environmental services, and
a ”bad”, degradation of the environment. Second, while households can not
directly purchase environmental quality, they can reorganize their activities so
less degradation results. If environmental quality is a normal good, one expects
substitution towards less degrading commodities, so that increases in income
will increase environmental quality. We show that natural constraints on the
desirability and feasibility of such substitution can produce non-monotonic re-
lationships between household income and environmental quality, and in par-
ticular can produce household-level environmental Kuznets curves.
∗We would like to thank for their helpful comments Matt Kahn, Arik Levinson, two anony-
mous reviewers, and participants in AERE/ASSA, NBER, NEUDC and Harvard Environmental
Economics and Policy seminars. Needless to say, we alone are responsible for any remaining errors.
1. Introduction
A number of papers have spurred both debate and additional study by suggesting
the existence of U-shaped relationships between per-capita income and various in-
dicators of environmental quality (e.g., air or water quality) at the aggregate level.1
This …nding—termed the environmental Kuznets curve—suggests that while eco-
nomic growth may initially be associated with degradation of the environment, con-
tinued growth may reverse initial adverse e¤ects. The ongoing attempts to con…rm
or refute this …nding, and continuing debate about its policy implications, indicate
a need for clear thinking about why such a relationship might arise.
An existing literature in the neoclassical growth tradition provides one way of
thinking about pollution and growth; it makes use of a representative agent frame-
work to explore optimal intertemporal tradeo¤s between current consumption, in-
vestment in capital, and pollution control.2 A good example is Gruver (1976), which
extends the standard neoclassical growth model by incorporating the portfolio choice
between investments in productive capital and pollution-control capital. A key re-
sult is that under certain parameter con…gurations it is possible for the optimal
growth path to be unbalanced. The emphasis in the initial stages of growth is on
the accumulation of productive capital, which results in increasing levels of output
and pollution, but once a target stock of productive capital is reached, savings are
shifted towards pollution-control capital, leading to reductions in pollution.
Such analysis is certainly suggestive. However, the representative agent frame-
work used for such dynamic analysis of growth paths lacks a political economic
or other explicit mechanism through which the environmental e¤ects of economic
growth might in reality be reversed. Further, the mechanisms underlying such a non-
monotonic aggregate relationship may be relatively complex. For instance, even if
all households valued the environment, given externalities it is not clear how such
preferences would be aggregated to yield pollution control policies. Also, the factors
underlying aggregate relationships may include economy-wide shifts in consump-
tion, involving di¤erential growth rates among economic sectors along a develop-
ment path. Finally, underlying aggregate mechanisms might also involve trade. For
instance, as a country grows richer it might cease to produce goods featuring “dirty”
production processes, and instead simply import the …nished goods.3
To develop simple and transparent intuitions, we step back from these aggregate
complications to explicitly consider one building block of aggregate relationships:
the way that households change the quality of their environments in response to
changes in income when they have a high degree of control over that quality.4 While
we acknowledge the complications of moving to the aggregate level, if our results
hold for each household, they are intrinsic to an economy. Also, once we have better
understood the household dynamic, we can explicitly add complications.
While particular preferences for the environment could drive results, we assume
only that environmental quality is a normally valued good.5 Our household pro-
duction model emphasizes two features.6 First, degradation of the environmental
endowment is a by-product of household activities. We present a model in which
households consume marketed commodities that bundle a ”good”, desired non-
environmental services, with a ”bad”, degradation of the environment. Second,
while households can not directly purchase environmental quality, they can reorga-
nize their activities so that less degradation results.
In this context, the theoretical puzzle of the existence of environmental Kuznets
curves concerns how non-monotonic Engel curves for environmental quality can
arise. If environmental quality is a normal good, the Engel curves for environ-
ment ought to be positively sloped at all incomes. That is, one expects household
substitution towards more expensive but less environmentally degrading marketed
commodities, so that rising income increases environmental quality monotonically.7
We show that the possibility of a non-monotonic relationship between household
income and environmental quality can still arise quite naturally.8 Consider that
rising income also increases demand for the non-environmental services produced
by environmentally-degrading marketed commodities. Thus, substitution towards
more environmentally-friendly commodities is necessary for environmental quality
to rise. We show that natural constraints on the desirability and feasibility of such
substitution will generate ranges of income in which substitution does not occur.
When these are preceded or followed by ranges of incomes in which substitution
occurs and dominates, a non-monotonic household environmental Engel curve will
result. In particular, a household-level environmental Kuznets curve may arise.
Three situations lead to a lack of substitution. First, poorer households con-
suming little and having degraded the environment only a little are not willing to
pay higher prices for less degrading commodities. Second, when an increase in in-
come leads a household to transition from a cheaper mix of commodities to a more
expensive but less environmentally degrading one, the household will use only the
transitional commodity for a time because of the discrete rise in price for the more
expensive mix. And third, when richer households have fully substituted to the least
degrading commodity, there no longer exists scope for further substitution.
Below, Section 2 outlines a simple household-production framework and illus-
trates how the competing demands, for non-environmental services and the substitu-
tion that increases environmental quality, can yield a non-monotonic environmental
Engel curve (even when the environment is normally valued). Section 3 then provides
analytical results, starting with a two-good case in which the choice of ”how much”
versus ”how clean” illustrates the …rst and third reasons above for why substitution
does not occur, and then for a three-good case in which the optimal purchases of
marketed goods illustrate the second reason above for an absence of substitution.
Section 4 concludes with a brief discussion and implications for further research.
2. Household production model
We begin with the observation that many environmental services cannot be directly
purchased. Rather, households start with endowments of environmental amenities,
which are degraded through the consumption of marketed commodities. For in-
stance, in many poor, developing economies, the consumption of marketed fuels
such as …rewood or kerosene results in the joint production of services that house-
holds value (e.g., heat) and reductions in existing indoor air quality. We formalize
this observation within a household production/characteristics framework. We use
the simplest possible model to demonstrate that non-monotonic environmental En-
gel curves, such as household-level environmental Kuznets curves, may arise.
Let s denote a household’s consumption of a generic non-environmental service,
and let a denote the level of the environmental amenity enjoyed by the household.
Neither s nor a can be directly purchased. Instead, they are jointly produced (in the
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case of a, degraded from the endowed level) through the consumption of marketed
commodities. Consider a situation in which households have a choice between two
marketed goods, a “dirty” (more environmentally destructive) good d and a “clean”
good c. Assuming that s is generated linearly from the use of these goods, we can,
without further loss of generality, rede…ne the units in which the two goods are
measured so that the total volume of valued services s is given by:
s(~q) = qd + qc (2.1)
where ~q = ( qd; qc) are quantities of the dirty and clean goods respectively. Without
losing any of the basic intuitions, we can also assume that the degradation of the
environmental amenity a is fully linear in the marketed commodities. We assume
both that the total emissions level e is linear in the purchased goods:
e(~q) = ®qd + ¯qc (2.2)
where ® > ¯ > 0, and that the environmental amenity is linear in total emissions,
where A is the initial environmental endowment and A > 0:
a(e) = A¡ e (2.3)
The household chooses the marketed ~q to maximize (2.4) subject to (2.5):
U(s; a) (2.4)
pdqd + pcqc = y (2.5)
where y is household income and pd and pc are, respectively, the per-unit (of services)
prices of the dirty and clean goods (we also assume that pd < pc).
In this two-good case, it is instructive to recast the problem as a household




be the share of the clean good in the overall service consumption of the household.
The s(~q), a(~q) technologies then imply a function a(s; ¼) such that:
as ´ @a
@s
< 0 and a¼ ´ @a
@¼
> 0 (2.7)
In other words, holding constant the share of clean goods, increased service con-
sumption leads to a deterioration in environmental quality, and holding constant
overall services, substitution to the clean good improves environmental quality.
Households then choose s and ¼ to maximize (2.8) subject to (2.9):
U(s; a(s; ¼)) (2.8)
pd(1¡ ¼)s+ pc¼s = y (2.9)
0 · ¼ · 1
We assume that U(:) is increasing and concave in both arguments, and that prefer-
ences are such that the demands for s and a would be normal were households able
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to directly purchase them. With these assumptions, it is straightforward to show
that the household’s optimal choices of both s and ¼ will be weakly increasing in
y, household income. That immediately raises the possibility that the relationship
















For example, it could be that the demand for services s would rise rapidly from
lower to middle incomes and then ‡atten, while that for “being cleaner”, i.e. for ¼,
would rise only at higher levels of household income. This could produce a U-shaped
Engel curve.9 The intuition here is that the ability to substitute between marketed
goods allows a separation of two decisions: how much service to consume, and how
to produce that service. The fact that these two decisions may move independently
with respect to income allows for their combined e¤ect to be non-monotonic.
3. Analysis
3.1. Two Goods – “how much” versus “how clean”
To derive analytical results, we now specify (2.4) further, in order to use the ex-
ample of homothetic, Cobb-Douglas preferences for non-environmental services and
environmental quality (the latter is simply normally valued, not a luxury good):
U(s; a) = sman;m+ n = 1 (3.1)
and maximize (3.1) subject to (2.9) through the choice of s and ¼. This gives rise to
a non-linear programming problem, the …rst-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions of which
lead one to consider the following three cases: ¼¤ = 0; 0 < ¼¤ < 1; and ¼¤ = 1.
These correspond to using only the dirty good, using a mix of marketed goods, and
using only the clean good. As developed further below, it is clear that when the
…rst or third cases are optimal, rising income will cause environmental quality to
fall. This is because the share of the clean good is …xed (at zero or one), i.e. no
substitution is occurring as income rises, such that the last term in (2.10) is zero. In
the second case, substitution occurs and environmental quality rises with income.
3.1.1. Not Clean & Environment Degraded
In this model, ¼¤ = 0 (“not clean”) is optimal for poorer households, i.e.:
y · Ampd(pc ¡ pd)
pd(1¡m)(®¡ ¯) + ®(pc ¡ pd) (3.2)
For these households, service demanded (or “how much”) will rise with income,












Recall, at zero income the household receives zero services but a positive endow-
ment of environmental quality. This asymmetry makes it likely that the marginal
utility of services is higher than that of environment. Thus, a poor household could
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use the cleaner good, but desires not to, preferring to obtain services as rapidly as
possible. Note that for larger m and A, even higher income households use only the
dirty good. This makes sense: the greater the weight the household places on ser-
vices, and the greater the environmental endowment, the more the household must
consume the dirty good to provide services and degrade the environment before
being willing to substitute to more expensive but less degrading goods.
Figure 1 helps to develop this intuition. The endowment is at the upper left
(s = 0, a > 0). The dashed rays are the combinations of a and s attainable through
exclusive use of one good. The solid lines connecting the rays are budget constraints
for di¤erent levels of income; larger budgets are further from the endowment. The
budget slopes indicate the relative shadow price of environment and services—i.e.,
the rate at which households can trade o¤ environment and services given the un-
derlying technologies and the prices of the marketed goods being consumed. The
negative slope re‡ects our assumption that dirtier goods are cheaper than cleaner
goods per unit of service produced. The shape of the indi¤erence curves comes from
the concavity of the utility function, into which both a and s enter positively.
This …gure shows the optimal consumption points of the household at six di¤er-
ent levels of income. The two income transitions from point A to point C involve
degradation of environmental quality. Juxtaposing the indi¤erence curves with the
budget sets shows why in the lowest income transition from A to B, while the
household could substitute it does not desire any of the clean good. Because the
endowment is so skewed towards environmental quality, moving as rapidly as possi-
ble to greater balance of s and a is preferable, and this dictates using only the dirty
good. Thus no substitution to less degrading commodities occurs.
Note that in transitions such as from B to C, during which the household starts
to substitute, rising income can lower environmental quality. The reason is that over
much of this income range no substitution to cleaner goods is preferred. For this
transition, Figure 1 highlights that given the asymmetric endowment the household
would like to substitute in the other direction, to a cheaper, dirtier good.10 At the
income at which B is chosen, the household would have preferred B’ (note that
from this unconstrained point, environmental quality would have increased in the
shift to C). In sum, then, at low incomes the asymmetric endowment discourages
substitution to cleaner goods, and thus rising income degrades the environment.
3.1.2. Partially Clean & Environment Improved
The 0 < ¼¤ < 1 (“partially clean”) case is optimal for middle incomes:
Ampd(pc ¡ pd)
pd(1¡m)(®¡ ¯) + ®(pc ¡ pd) < y <
Ampc(pc ¡ pd)
pc(1¡m)(®¡ ¯) + ¯(pc ¡ pd) (3.4)
For these households, as suggested above, since environmental quality is a nor-
mally valued good, “how clean” (or ¼¤) will rise enough with income to o¤set the
fact that “how much” service is demanded (or s¤) will also rise with income. The
end result is that environmental quality increases with income:
s¤ =
m[A(pc ¡ pd) + y(®¡ ¯)]





(®¡ ¯)2pd(1¡m) + (®¡ ¯)®(pc¡ pd)(1¡m)
(®pc ¡ ¯pd)(pc ¡ pd) > 0 (3.6)
In Figure 1, from C to D environmental quality improves. The reason is that
substitution is both desirable and feasible, so that the household’s choices can raise
its consumption of both normal goods s and a. Thus, the transitions from A to D
trace out a non-monotonic and in fact a U-shaped relationship between y and a, i.e.
a household-level environmental Kuznets curve over this range of incomes.
3.1.3. Completely Clean & Environment Degraded
The ¼¤ = 1 (“completely clean”) corner solution is optimal for richer households:
y ¸ Ampc(pc ¡ pd)
pc(1¡m)(®¡ ¯) + ¯(pc ¡ pd) (3.7)
For these households, still “how much” service is demanded rises with income,












The intuition here is that the household can no longer substitute. While sub-
stitution remains desirable, it is no longer feasible since the household is using only
the cleanest good.11 Again, the values of m and A a¤ect the income range.12 Figure
1 con…rms that environmental improvement is infeasible once the household is at
point E, using only the clean good. Thus, the full set of transitions traces out an
”inverted N” relationship of air quality to income, as in the top half of Figure 3.13
3.2. Three Goods – quantity choice
To illustrate an additional reason for the absence of the substitution that lies be-
hind the increasing environmental quality in (3.6), we introduce a third marketed
commodity, which we call the ”transitional” good (denoted qt). This good is cleaner
than the dirty good but dirtier than the clean good. Now the household’s problem
is to choose ~q to maximize (3.1) subject to non-negativity constraints on ~q and to
(3.9) and (3.10) below (in which ® > ° > ¯ > 0 and pd < pt < pc):
s(~q) = qd + qt + qc;a(~q) = A¡ (®qd + °qt + ¯qc) (3.9)
pdqd + ptqt + pcqc = y (3.10)
We must consider …ve cases: 1) qd > 0; qt = 0; qc = 0; 2) qd > 0; qt > 0; qc = 0;
3) qd = 0; qt > 0; qc = 0; 4) qd = 0; qt > 0; qc > 0; and 5) qd = 0; qt = 0; qc > 0.
The …rst and …fth cases are analogous to the low and high income cases for ¼ above,
in which environmental quality must fall with income. This is because there is no
substitution when either only the dirty or only the clean good is used, although in
the …rst case substitution is not desirable, while in the …fth case it is not feasible.
The second and fourth cases are analogous to the middle income case for ¼, where
substitution is desirable and feasible and permits rising environmental quality.
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The case that introduces a new feature is the third one, in which only the
transitional good is consumed. This case is optimal for the following income range:
Ampt(pt ¡ pd)
(1¡m)(®pt ¡ °pd) +m°(pt ¡ pd) · y ·
Ampt(pc ¡ pt)
(1¡m)(°pc ¡ ¯pt) +m°(pc ¡ pt)
(3.11)
For these households, again “how much” service is demanded rises with income,
and again environmental quality must fall, as seen in the following:








While as in the …rst case substitution is feasible but not desirable, the reasoning
has changed. In the …rst case, the asymmetric endowment makes environmental
quality of little marginal value, but at incomes lower than in (3.11), the household
has already been willing to pay for the transitional good to lessen environmental
degradation. Substitution is not desirable because as the household comes to the
point of consuming only the transitional good, it faces a discrete shift in the price
faced for further substitution, because such substitution would involve replacing the
dirty good with the clean good in the mix with the transitional good. For a range
of incomes, this jump in the ”cost of clean” discourages further substitution. Thus,
only the transitional fuel is used, and environmental quality must fall with income.
Figure 2 helps to develop this intuition. It adds the transitional good to Figure
1, and depicts optimal consumption at six levels of income. As in Figure 1, lower
income transitions (A to C) trace out a U-shaped income-environmental quality
relationship. However, low and middle incomes (A to D or E) trace out a inverted–
N-shaped relationship even before the clean good is used. Figure 2 shows that when
an increase in income leads to a shift in the goods mix, as in the shift from C to
E, the relative price of s and a will change. In particular, the relative price of
environmental quality will rise, resulting in the household choosing a reduced level
of environmental quality as income rises past the transition point.14
Finally, rising income given this new mix of goods again permits substitution
and increasing environmental quality (from E to F), as in this linear characteristics
case the relative price of s and a is constant while the household consumes the same
mix of goods. Then as in Figure 1, environmental quality will of course fall when
only the clean good is used. Thus, the existence of the transitional good permits
multiple income ranges in which environmental quality decreases, increases, and
then decreases again as income rises (see the bottom half of Figure 3). This would
continue if additional transitional goods existed, or if cleaner ones were invented.
4. Conclusion
This paper has provided a simple, transparent perspective that helps to clarify
whether the “environmental Kuznets curve” is an aggregate pollution-income rela-
tionship that one should expect based on the household choices that may underlie
it. Our approach is distinguished by explicit modeling of a situation in which the
household can control environmental quality (this makes it interpretable as a social
planning problem as well). We emphasize that: (1) degradation of the environ-
mental endowment is a by-product of household activities; and (2) a household can
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reorganize its activities such that less degradation results. If environmental qual-
ity is a normally valued good, as we have assumed, one might expect household
substitution towards less degrading marketed commodities, such that rising income
increases environmental quality monotonically. However, we show that natural con-
straints on the desirability and feasibility of this type of substitution can produce a
non-monotonic relationship, such as a household-level environmental Kuznets curve.
Study of the household-level pollution-income relationship has value for positive
work on the aggregate relationship. It suggests hypotheses whose testing may illu-
minate underlying mechanisms. For instance, Chaudhuri and Pfa¤ (1999) pursue
the implications of this model by examining Pakistani households’ shifts between
fuels as household income rises, to get a sense for how households are in fact making
the sorts of tradeo¤s described above regarding indoor air quality. Also, our focus
on substitution leads to the testable prediction that when most services are pro-
duced using transitional or the cleanest techniques, increases in income will lower
environmental quality, potentially yielding “inverted-N-shaped” (not ”U-shaped”)
relationships between income and environmental quality, or even ongoing sinusoidal
relationships if innovation leads to ever cleaner new goods and techniques.
Once the household problem and its implications are better understood, we can
start to add back the complications that arise when many agents interact to pro-
duce the environmental outcome. For instance, our household production framework
suggests the possibility of endogenously increasing (environmental) product variety
and quality during the process of income growth. With incomes rising, as more
households are willing to substitute towards cleaner and potentially more expen-
sive inputs, …rms will have more incentive to provide newer, cleaner inputs. To our
knowledge, this has not been explored, and we plan to pursue this in future research.
In addition, with respect to pollution policies, representative agent-based optimal
growth models necessarily assume away free-rider problems and other household-
level externalities that may be important in practice. In contrast, while in this
paper we have not emphasized the common property characteristics of many en-
vironmental amenities, nor performed the explicit aggregation that would provide
a direct link between our household-level analysis and aggregate phenomena, the
framework presented here provides the building blocks for a more explicit treatment
of aggregation and free-rider issues. For instance, within politico-economic models
that emphasize a regulatory channel through which an environmental Kuznets curve
might come about, our framework should permit a more detailed characterization
of why and how environmental voting behavior might change with income.
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ENDNOTES
1. See, for instance, World Bank (1992), Selden & Song (1994), Sha…k (1994), Holtz-
Eakin & Selden (1995), and Grossman & Krueger (1995).
2. See, for instance, Plourde (1972), Keeler et al. (1972), D’Arge and Kogiku (1973),
Forster (1973), Gruver (1976), Stevens (1976), Asako (1980), Becker (1982), Tahvo-
nen and Kuuluvainen (1993), Selden & Song (1995), Chimeli and Braden (2001),
Chimeli (2001), and Stokey (1998).
3. E¤ects of trade in the context of income growth have been discussed by, among
others, Saint-Paul (1995) and Jaeger (1998). Copeland and Taylor (1995) include
the e¤ect of trade on national incomes in considering the e¤ects of trade on the
environment within a general equilibrium setting.
4. Further, as our household fully internalizes its environmental e¤ects, our results
are consistent with e¢cient choice by a social planner.
5. Lopez (1994) and Selden and Song (1995) describe roles for preferences, while
Andreoni and Levinson (2001) posit a particular mechanism involving increasing
returns to abatement to explain the environmental Kuznets curve.
6. Classic early references in the household production literature include Gorman
(1980), Becker (1965), Lancaster (1966a, 1966b).
7. While the example we mention on occasion below is household fuel switching in
a developing country context (e.g., substitution from dung and wood to kerosene to
liquid propone to natural gas as income rises), other examples of this kind of house-
hold substitution include: paying more for wind-powered electricity generation, or
for more fuel e¢cient air conditioners; purchasing more expensive but biodegrad-
able garbage bags; and buying a costlier but higher mileage automobile. These raise
the issue of household voting and regulation, since they may not feature the same
degree of internalization as fuels and indoor air quality. However, still people do
these things of their own accord.
8. The household-level relationship between income and environmental quality
might in fact take on any number of shapes, including a monotic rise in quality. This
indeterminacy is an attractive property, as despite the attention given to evidence
of U-shaped relationships, a more robust empirical …nding is that the relationship
is potentially non-monotonic. Also, some investigations …nd that there does not
appear to be any signi…cant aggregate empirical relationship at all.
9. For a more general but perhaps less illustrative intuition, ignore for the moment
the fact that the input demand functions may not be di¤erentiable at all incomes
because of binding non-negativity constraints on input use, and represent the slope













The key point to note here is that the demand for the marketed inputs is derived
from the household’s preferences for s and a. Thus, there can be no presumption
that the demand for a marketed good will be normal. In fact, within a characteris-
tics/household production framework, inferior marketed goods can be quite common
(Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), Lipsey and Rosenbluth (1971)). If, therefore, dirty
inputs are inferior (after a certain income) while clean inputs are normal, it is quite
possible that the Engel curve for the environmental amenity will be U-shaped.
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10. In the analytical results, this is suggested by the optimal ¼¤ in this income range
being negative in the absence of non-negativity constraints on ¼.
11. In Figure 1, that substitution remains desirable is conveyed by point E’ being
preferred to point E (analogous to the low-income case of B’ preferred to B).
12. It is also worth noting that adding a …xed cost to the clean fuel leaves the
ideas discussed above intact, although not surprisingly the value of the parameter
representing the …xed cost also a¤ects the income ranges.
13. Here it should be noted that Stokey (1998) also …nds corner solutions as part of
an environmental Kuznets curve, although only for poorer households.
14. Note that while relative shadow prices of non-marketed goods shifting with
income characterizes household-production models in general, only when marketed
goods bundle a “good” with a “bad” could the relative price shift accompanying an
increase in income outweigh the direct e¤ect of income. For instance, in the classic
household production model in which marketed foods are purchased to provide a set
of non-marketed “good” nutrients, an increase in income cannot lead to a decrease
in the consumption of any nutrient (unless a non-marketed nutrient is a Gi¤en good,
which is rare – a statement which should not be confused with our earlier assertion
that within a household production framework, inferior or Gi¤en goods can be quite
common among marketed commodities). Or, consider the case of homothetic pref-
erences. In the nutrients case, the mix of marketed foods and relative shadow price
of nutrients faced never change as income rises (in the analytical results, income
does not appear in the nutrient share). In contrast, as Figure 2 indicates, when
marketed commodities bundle a good with a bad, even with homothetic preferences
a household must eventually change its mix of goods, and the relative shadow price
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FIGURE 3
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